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I 
(Information) 
COUNCIL AND COMMISSION 
SEVENTEENTH REPORT 
ON THE ACTIVITIES  OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE 
FOREWORD 
The purpose of this  report is  to give  a  brief account of  the activities of the Monetary 
Committee during 1975. 
During the year,  the Committee held 13  sessions  and the working parties drawn from 
its  own members or set up  at its  initiative met on many occasions. A  list of members 
as at 31 December 197  5 is  annexed hereto. 
The report was adopted as at 31 December 1975. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  197  5  was  marked  by  an  economic  recession 
such as  has not occurred since the 1930s. It affected 
all  the  industrialized  countries  and  the  non-oil-
producing  developing  countries;  its  repercussions 
'vere reflected  in  international trade, which declined 
sharply  in  volume.  The  balance  of  payments 
situation in  1975  was  characterized by a  substantial 
reduction  in  the  OPEC  surplus,  a  considerable 
improvement for the major industrial countries as  a 
group,  and  a  deterioration  for  other  groups  of 
countries,  the  non-oil-producing  developing 
countries,  the  smaller  OECD  members  and  the 
centrally planned economies. 
L  Although  the  economic  recession  led  to  the 
restoration of a  better balance on external accounts 
in  all  Community  countries,  it  caused  considerable 
unemployment  in  each  of  them  and  brought  only 
partial  relief  from  inflation.  In  these  circumstances 
the  Community authorities,  as  in the previous  year, 
sought to help Member States in difficulty and, as  a 
matter of priority, to safeguard the gains which the 
Community  had  made  thus  far  and  which  might 
have  been  threatened  in  the  difficult  economic 
situation. 
COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE 
3.  At  the  beginning  of  1975,  five  Community 
Member  States  were  applying  the  Community 
arrangements of 10 April  1972 on the narrowing of 
intra-Community exchange rate margins  (the snake). 
On  10  July,  however,  France,  which  had  left  the 
snake  on  21  January  1974,  announced  that  the 
French franc was officially rejoining the snake at its 
old  central  rate.  At  this  time,  the  workings  of  the No C 132/2  Official Journal of the European Communities  14.6. 76 
system  were  modified:  while  the  three-month 
extension  under  the  very  short-term  financing 
mechanism  had,  until  then,  only  been  possible 
through  agreement  between  the  debtors  and  the 
creditors,  henceforth  it  became  automatically 
available to the debtor on request, subject to certain 
limits.  With  regard  to  settlement,  the  rules  were 
adapted  by  excluding  gold  from  the  calculation  of 
reserves  and formally  confirming its  exclusion  from 
the actual settlements themselves. 
4.  During the year, a solution was found, initially 
in  the  context of the  European Development Fund, 
to  the  important  problem  of  the  European  unit  of 
account.  At  the  Council  session  of  16  September 
1974,  the Monetary Committee had been  instructed 
to start work on the problem of the units of account 
operating  in  various  sectors  and  had  already 
submitted two opinions before the end of 1974  (see 
paragraph 30 of the sixteenth annual report). 
5.  On  the  basis  of  a  report  prepared  by  the 
alternates,  the  Monetary  Committee  adopted  a 
further  opinion  on  this  matter  at  its  meeting  of 
4  March  (Annex  I),  and on  18  March the Council 
adopted  a  new  unit  of  account  for  the  Lome 
Convention  transactions  where  the  need  was 
particularly  urgent.  This  unit  of  account  was  a 
'basket' type, equivalent in value to 1 SDR on 28 June 
1974 and composed of the following amounts in the 
currencies of the Member States: 
DN!  0·828  (27·3 °/o) 
£sterling  0·0885  (17·5 °/o) 
FF  1·15  (19·5 °/o) 
Lit  109  (14·0 °/o) 
Fl  0·286  (9·0 °/o) 
Bfrs  3·66  (7·9 °/o) 
Lfr  0·14  (0·3 °/o) 
Dkr  0·217  (3·0 °/o) 
Irish£  0·00759  (1·5 °/o) 
The  value  of  the  unit  of  account  in  various 
currencies  is  calculated  and  published  daily  by  the 
Commission departments. The same unit of account 
was  subsequently  applied  by  the  European 
Investment Bank and also  adopted by the European 
Coal and Steel  Community. Moreover, at its meeting 
in  Rome  on  2  December,  the  European  Council 
noted  the  Commission's  intention  to  present 
proposals to the Council with regard to the applica-
tion of the European unit of account to the Commu-
nity budget as  a further step. 
6.  International monetary matters, particularly the 
reform  of  the  international  monetary  system, 
occupied  much  of  the  time  of  the  Monetary 
Committee  during  the  year.  This  arose  from  the 
quinquennial  review  of  quotas  in  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  the  need  to  make  further  progress 
in  reform  of the  international  monetary system  and 
to  amend  the  articles  of  agreement  to  reflect  the 
reforms agreed. 
7.  The Monetary Committee played an important 
role  in  the  process  of  arriving  at  a  common 
Community  position  on  these  problems.  Three 
aspects  m  particular  were  at  the  centre  of 
negotiatiOns:  the distribution of the increases in IMF 
quotas, the problem of gold, and the question of the 
exchange rate system. 
8.  On  quotas,  against  the  background  of 
agreement  already  reached  in  the  IMF  on  the 
doubling of quota shares of OPEC countries and the 
maintenance of quota shares of developing countries, 
the  essential  features  of  the  Committee's  position 
were: 
(a)  agreement  to  generalize  qualified  majonties  for 
voting  on important issues  in  the  IMF  at  85 °/o 
instead of 80 °/o; 
(b)  agreement on a distribution of the quotas among 
industrialized  countries  on  the  basis  of  a 
modified  application  of  the  Bretton  Woods 
formula. 
9.  In  its  report  of  27  June  (Annex  II),  the 
Committee  endorsed  proposals  concerning  the  gold 
holdings  of the IMF  and worked out arrangements 
on  gold  transactions  by  monetary  authorities 
reflecting  the  consensus  reached  between  EEC 
finance  ministers  at Zeist on 22  and 23  April  1974 
(see paragraph 27 of the sixteenth annual report), all 
of which were the basis for subsequent agreement at 
the IMF Interim Committee in August. 
10.  Later, the Committee agreed to press the need 
to  maintain  symmetry  in  the  implementation  of 
certain  elements  of the  gold  package,  namely  gold 
sales  for  the  benefit  of  developing  countries,  gold 
restitution  to  member  countries  and  freedom  for 
monetary  authorities  to  undertake  transactions  in 
gold. 
11.  In  discussion  of  a  clause  on  collaboration 
with  the  IMF  in  relation  to  gold  policy,  the 
Committee  agreed  that  the  IMF  articles  should 
promote the SDR as the principal reserve asset in the 
international monetary system and that any references 
to  the  reduction  of  the  ro1le  of  gold  should  be 
accompanied  by  references  to  the  reduction  in  the 
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12.  Throughout  the  discussion,  the  Monetary 
Committee maintained the importance of a balanced 
package of new arrangements in the IMF, even when 
at the 31  August meeting of the Interim Committee 
no immediate progress proved possible on exchange 
rate  arrangements.  On  the  latter  point,  the 
Committee reached agreement on the framework of 
ultimate  objectives  as  recorded  in  its  report  of  27 
June.  Later the Committee supported the agreement 
reached  by  the  French  and  American  authorities, 
which,  in  turn,  provided  the  basis  for  the  overall 
agreement at Jamaica in January 1976. 
13.  In  accordance  with  the  arrangements 
determined by the Council,  particularly with regard 
to the economic policy conditions, on the granting of 
medium-term financial  assistance  of 1 159·2  million 
units  of  account  to  Italy  in  December  1974,  the 
Committee  kept  under  review  the  Italian  economic 
and  financial  situation.  For  this  purpose,  a  special 
working party was set up under the chairmanship of 
Mr  de  la  Geniere.  Acting  on  a  recommendation 
from the Commission and on the basis of an opinion 
of  the  Monetary  Committee,  the  Council  on 
18  December  1975  adapted  the  economic  policy 
conditions  attached  to  the  medium-term  financial 
assistance to Italy for the following year. 
14.  In  accordance  with  Article  4  of  the  Council 
Decision  of  22  March  1971  on  the  medium-term 
financial  assistance  mechanism,  a  Monetary 
Committee working party under the chairmanship of 
Mr  Andersen  twice  examined  the  balance  of 
payments  situation  and  reserves  position  of  the 
United Kingdom which, though continuing to supply 
short-term  assistance  on  a  bilateral  basis,  had  not 
participated in  the  medium-term financial  assistance 
to  Italy.  At  its  meetings  of  15  April  and  28 
November,  the  Monetary  Committee  approved  the 
conclusions of its working party's reports, which, on 
both  occasions,  were  that  the  United  Kingdom's 
non-participation  in  the  medium-term  financing 
continued to be admissible. 
15.  In  connection  with  possible  borrowing  by 
Italy  and  Ireland  under  the  Community  loan 
scheme,  the  Monetary  Committee  began 
examinations of the economic situation of both these 
countries. 
16.  The  Committee  gave  special  attention  to  its 
regular  examinations  of  monetary  and  financial 
developments  in  Member  States  with  particular 
emphasis on the monetary policy pursued, as  well as 
on  the  problems  of financing  the  budget deficits  of 
the Member States. 
17.  The  Committee  also  examined  various  other 
matters,  including proposals  for  Community action, 
such  as  strengthening  the  role  of  the  European 
monetary  cooperation  fund,  and  the  issue  of  loans 
by  Euratom for  financing  nuclear power stations, as 
well  as  arrangements for  the preparation of Council 
sessions  on  economic  and  financial  questions  and 
proposals to change the conversion rates for national 
currencies  into  units  of account for the purposes of 
the common agricultural policy. 
WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE 
18.  The  Working  Party  on  Securities  Markets 
continued  to  examine  developments  in  the  capital 
markets of the Member States and in the internat,ional 
capital markets and discussed capital market policies. 
It examined various aspects  of the effect  of inflation 
on financial assets and the possibilities of indexation. 
In particular it completed its report begun in 1974 on 
'Methods  of protecting  the  holder of bonds  against 
inflation  and  their  effects  on  intra-Community 
capital  movements'  (Annex  III).  The working party 
also  continued  its  work  on  the  regulation  of  issue 
conditions  on  the  bond  markets  of  the  Member 
States.  This  is  a  continual  process  of up-dating and 
correction  and  is  intended  to  supplement  its  1970 
report  on  'Policy  on  the  bond  markets  of  the 
countries of the EEC'. 
19.  Following the  request from  the  Council at ,its 
meeting  of  16  September  1974  for  the  Monetary 
Committee  and the  Committee of Governors  of the 
Central Banks to begin work as  soon as  possible on 
coordinated  action  on  the  euromarkets  (see  the 
sixteenth  annual  report),  the Committees decided  to 
entrust  this  task  to  the  Working  Party  on  Short-
Term  Capital  Movements,  which  for  this  purpose 
was  to  become  a  joint  working  party  of  the 
Monetary  Committee  and  the  Committee  of 
Governors.  At -its  meeting  of  12  February,  the 
Monetary Committee accordingly amended the terms 
of  reference  of  this  working  party.  The  working 
party began  work on the Eurocurrency  market and 
the regulation of international financial flows. 
20.  The  Working  Party  on  Harmonization  of 
Monetary Policy  Instruments set up jointly with the 
Committee  of Governors  in  1974  met  several  times 
during  the  year,  in  execution  of  its  terms  of 
reference.  The  working  party  intends  to  submit  an 
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ANNEX 1 
REPORT  OF  THE  MONETARY  COMMITTEE TO  THE  COUNCIL  AND  THE 
COMMISSION ON THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT 
l.  The  Committee  examined  the  problem  of  the 
definition  of  a  new  unit  of  account  in  the  light  of  the 
report submitted by the  alternates  (text annexed)  and of 
a  simulation  exercise  submitted by  the  Commission. 
2.  Recent  monetary  events  which  have  led  to 
generalized  floating  of  currencies  are  responsible  for 
difficulties  in  the use  of the unit of account in  the EEC, 
based  as  they  were  on  the  concept  of  par  values  and 
defined  by  a  weight of gold.  The  Committee  recognized 
the  need  for  the  definition  of  a  new  unit  of  account 
better suited to  the present circumstances and capable of 
being  applied  progressively  in  different  sectors  with  the 
necessary  adaptations  in  respect  of  conversion  rules.  In 
the  case  of  the  EMCF,  however,  where  transactions  are 
only  between  countries  whose  currencies  maintain  fixed 
relationships  between themselves,  the existing parity grid 
unit is  the most satisfactory. 
3.  Apart  from  this  the  Committee  felt  that  a  unit  of 
account  based  on  a  'standard'  basket  of  European 
currencies would be  the most appropriate for Community 
purposes in general. 
4.  The  Committee,  having  closely  examined  the 
arguments  developed  in  the  report  of  the  alternates 
concerning  the  Weights  of  component  currencies  in  the 
basket,  noted  that  even  appreciable  differences  in  the 
weights attributed to each currency would only make for 
minor differences in  the behaviour of the unit of account 
as  a  whole. The Committee examined in detail the range 
of  criteria  which  should  be  taken  into  account  for  the 
definition  of  an  EEC  basket;  it  feels  that  it  has  thus 
prepared the ground for the decisions to be taken. 
5.  The Committee felt  that the  new unit of account as 
defined  under 3  above could be immediately adopted for 
use  by  the  EDF.  It  suggested  that  this  might  provide  a 
basis  on which the authorities of the EIB  could reach  an 
interim  decision  on  arrangements  for  conversions  of 
currencies  to  be  used  in  its  accounts.  It  considered  that 
further  studies would be  necessary  before  the  unit could 
be  adopted, with the  necessary  adaptations in respect  of 
conversion rules, in other sectors of Community activity. 
6.  It took note of the intention of the  Commission to 
submit proposals to the Council in  this connection. 
Appendix 
Report of monetary committee alternates on European units of account 
1.  The  Committee  has  studied,  in  collaboration  with 
appropriate  experts  whose  assistance  is  gratefully 
acknowledged,  some  of  the  practical  problems  in 
applying different types of units of account to  a  range of 
Community  activities.  The  Committee  has  not  had  time 
to  study the unit of account problems in  all  Community 
sectors,  but  has  chosen  for  examination  four  important 
sectors involving a wide range of different operations. 
2.  This report: 
reviews  the possible choices of units of account which 
have been considered; 
examines  the  appropriateness  of  different  units  of 
account  to  each  of  the  activities  which  have  been 
studied; 
sets out a number of general considerations; and 
- indicates the points for political decision on the basis 
of technically acceptable ranges of choices. 
Possible units of account 
].  The existing Community units of account which are 
based  on  fixed  par  values  and  stable  exchange  rate 
relationships  were  all  established  in  the  context  of  the 
maintenance  of  par values  of currencies  in  relation  to  a 
central  nttmeraire  of  gold  or  gold-based  dollars  in  the 
market.  The  fact  that this  context no  longer exists  has 
not  only  made  the  basis  of  the  Community  units  of 
account  out-of-date  but  has  in  many  cases  also 
introduced  difficulties  in  their  day-to-day  operation  or 
widespread dissatisfaction with the results.  Provision was 
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in par values but the present situation where par values 
formally  remain  unchanged  but  no  longer  correspond 
with  market  rates  was  not  foreseen.  Ad  hoc  solutions 
have therefore been necessary in many cases. 
4.  In current circumstances it is  still possible within the 
Community  to  retain  the  concept  of  a  fixed  value 
relationship  in  the  unit of  account,  but only  among  the 
'snake'  group  of  currencies  which  maintain  fixed 
relationships  between  themselves.  The  unit  of  account 
which embodies this  concept is  the parity  grid  unit.  The 
main  feature  of  this  unit  as  it  is  currently  used  in  the 
European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  for  intervention 
and settlement arrangements is  that all  'snake' currencies 
have  a  stable  value  in  it,  subject  to  minor  fluctuations 
within defined margins and to any deliberate central rate 
changes;  in  order  to  achieve  a  parallel  realistic 
relationship between this  unit and other currencies, these 
would  have  to  be  converted  by  reference  to  their 
fluctuating  market  relationship  with  the  average  of 
'snake'  currencies,  as  is  done  in  the  case  of the  present 
ECSC unit. 
5.  The alternative to the 'parity grid' approach is  some 
composite  unit  based  on  a  basket  of  currencies  and 
reflecting  the  combined  market  values  from  moment  to 
moment  of  all  the  constituent  currencies.  There  is  an 
important choice for the Community between a  basket of 
world currencies and a basket of EEC currencies. 
6.  The feature  of a  world-wide basket of currencies  is 
that it would be a  measure of some average  of values of 
all  world  currencies.  The  SDR  basket  adopted  by  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  with  effect  from  1  July 
1974  is  the  internationally  accepted  version  of  this 
concept  and  the  only  one  worth  consideration.  The  US 
dollar has a weight of nearly one-third in  the SDR basket 
and those EEC currencies included  in  it have a  weight of 
nearly one-half. 
7.  An  EEC  basket  would  represent  similarly  the 
concept of some average of values of all  EEC  currencies. 
The  total  number  of  EEC  currencies  is  a  manageable 
number for  inclusion  in  a  basket,  and  it  seems  desirable 
that  all  should  be  included.  Since  some  have  floating 
relationships  with·  each  other,  the  principles  of 
construction  and operation of the  basket would  have  to 
he  the  same  as  those  of the  SDR:  a  standard  basket  in 
which the amount of each component currency would he 
maintained unchanged. A  major problem is  the choice of 
wcightings  of the  nine  currencies  to  achieve  the  desired 
average result, and this is  discussed later. 
8.  The choices discussed below therefore are: 
the parity grid unit; 
the SDR; 
- one or more  versions  of an EEC basket. 
Conversion arrangements 
9.  It is  important  to  recognize  that  in  certain  sectors 
some  of the  most serious  problems  in  operating units  of 
account at the present time arise over rates of conversion 
into  national  currencies  which  do  not  automatically 
follow,  and  have  in  practice  diverged  substantially  from 
market rates.  The definition  of any new unit of account 
will  not automatically resolve  these problems, but in the 
interest  of  moving  to  more  realistic  conversion  rates,  it 
would be desirable to select a  definition which would be 
well adapted to this process. Even so, special arrangements 
might  be  needed  in  some  cases  to  maintain  these 
conversion rates  frozen  for certain periods of time.  Such 
special  arrangements, however, need not detract from the 
objective  of  ·choosing  a  new  and  more  appropriate 
definition of the unit of account. 
The M,zin Activities Examined 
10.  The  Committee  has  studied  with  the  help  of 
experts the  implications of trying to operate the units of 
account  discussed  above  in  relation  to  four  important 
activities  of  the  Community:  the  European  Monetary 
Cooperation Fund, the European Development Fund, the 
common agricultural policy, and the Community budget. 
The  following  paragraphs  highlight  points  of  particular 
interest and importance. 
11.  The  fundamental  need  for  some  unit  of  account 
for each of these activities rests generally on the technical 
requirement of a  single  denominator in  each of them for 
accounting  purposes;  an  additional  reason  in  several 
cases  is  that  aspects  of  the  operations  involve 
determination of values, claims  and obligations according 
to  a  system  of  sharing  among  participating  countries 
and  the  maintenance  of  equal  shares  and  claims  over 
time,  when  currencies  move  in  relation  to  each  other. 
Finally,  the unit of account may be useful  as  a  measure 
of  the  desired  rates  of  increase  in  different  sectors  of 
activity. 
12.  There  is  only  one  case  in  the  whole  range  of 
operations forming part of the four activities  which have 
been studied in which it can be said that the  choice of a 
particular  unit  of  account  automatically  solves  or 
eliminates  technical  problems,  whereas  any  other unit of 
account would  create  such  problems.  This  is  the  case  of 
the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund,  where  the 
unit  currently  in  use  - the  parity  grid  unit  - is  the 
satisfactory  one,  exactly  appropriate  to  the  needs  of the 
operations for which it ts  used. It is  no accident that this 
operation  is  distinct  from  all  other  Community 
operations for which units of account are required in the 
important  respect  that  it  is  by  definition  confined  to 
dealings  among  'snake'  countries,  i.e.  those  maintaining 
fixed  exchange  rate  relationships  between  themselves. 
The  Committee  has  not  considered  the  quite  different 
situation  which  would  arise  in  the  European  Monetary 
Cooperation Fund if  new  arrangements  (still  not capable 
of  being  defined)  were  introduced  to  cover  some 
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EEC  currencies,  not only  those  in  the 'snake'.  As  far  as 
the  existing  basis  of  operation  is  concerned,  however, 
there  seems  to  be  strong  technical  justification  for 
treating it as  exceptional and, whatever might be decided 
elsewhere,  confirming  the  use  of the  parity grid  unit for 
this purpose. 
13.  In  all  the other Community operations which have 
been examined, there is  need to cover all  members of the 
Community,  and  therefore  to  accommodate  currencies 
with floating value relationships.  Here it is  clear that the 
fundamental  difficulties  do  not stem  from  the  choice  of 
unit  of  account  and  cannot  be  automatically  solved  by 
any  particular  choice.  There  is  no  sleight  of  hand  by 
which  the  reconciliation  of  value  relationships  between 
all  EEC  currencies  at  the  present  time  can  be  achieved 
simply  through  the  definition  of  the  unit  of  account. 
One  unit  of  account  may  be  more  apt  than  another 
because  the  foreseeable  trend  of  its  value  is  more 
appropriately  suited  to  maintenance of the  desired  value 
of particular operations; different units will  tend to make 
for  a  larger  or  smaller  need  for  adjustment  to  match 
market  rate  changes  with  particular  different  EEC 
cun;encies.  Throughout,  however,  there  are  advantages 
and disadvantages to  be  noted  and a  judgment has  to  be 
made. 
14.  Many  of  the  problems  present  themselves  in  very 
similar ways in  relation  to  all  activities  which involve  all 
EEC  currencies.  But  before  entering  on  general 
considerations,  a  few  points  which  arise  on  particular 
activities are worth noting: 
(a)  European  Development  Fund:  The  choice  of unit  of 
account  is  a  determinant  of  the  trend  of purchasing 
power  and  cost  of  the  fund  as  a  whole  to  both 
recipients  and  donors.  The  Committee  considers  that 
the  value  of  'snake'  currencies  is  the  least 
appropriate  measure  for  this  purpose.  The  world 
value  measure  of  the  SDR  could  be  presented  as  a 
rational  choice  for  an  operation  directly  affecting 
many countries outside the Community, and would be 
familiar  and  readily  comprehensible  to  them.  From 
the  viewpoint  of  the  EEC  countries  it  is  more 
reasonable to  guarantee the amount in  an average of 
EEC  currencies,  and  the  fact  that expenditure  of the 
fund is  entirely linked to  supplies from EEC countries 
should  make  this  acceptable  also  to  the  recipient 
countries. 
(b)  Common  agricultural  policy  (CAP):  Experts  do  not 
see  any systematic relationship  between prices of CAP 
products  and  any  currency  or  group  of  currencies 
which  would  point  to  selection  of  a  particular 
unit  of  account.  Because  of  the  effects  on 
consumer  prices  and  the  incomes  of  farmers,  no 
member  country  wishes  to  allow  intervention  prices 
and levy  thresholds to follow  changes in  the value of 
its  currency. To this end, rates of conversion between 
units of account and EEC currencies are only adjusted 
by deliberate decision and do not automatically follow 
market fluctuations  or parity  changes,  at least  in  the 
short term.  Discrepancies with market rates  are made 
up  by  extra  payments  or  deductions  of  monetary 
compensation  amounts.  There  would  be  difficulty  in 
abolishing  these  monetary  compensation  amounts, 
particularly  on  an  automatic  basis,  due  to  their 
implications  for  price  levels  in  different  countries.  In 
this connection it can be noted that: 
(i)  an  average  EEC  basket  would  spread  necessary 
adjustments  among EEC  currencies  and minimize 
the risk of very large adustment being needed  for 
one  or  two  currencies.  It  would  however  also 
create  a · need  for  more  adjustments  or  the 
application  of  monetary  compensation  amounts 
among  all  currencies  in  the  case  of  changes  of 
value  of  any  currency.  For  'stronger'  currencies 
this  would mean - because  a  reduction  of farm 
prices  would  probably  not  be  possible  - a 
build-up of higher positive monetary compensation 
amounts,  the  abolition  of  which  later  on  may 
create major difficulties; 
(ii)  the parity grid  unit - assuming it  \Vould  tend  to 
be  stronger  than  the  average  of  EEC  currencie's 
- would involve for weaker currencies more and 
larger  adjustments  or  negative  monetary 
compensation  amounts,  additional  to  the  general 
farm  price  increases  to  bring  conversion  rates 
into  line  with  market  rates;  the  larger,  perhaps 
inflationary increases  demanded of countries with 
weaker  currencies  in  such  a  system  would  be  a 
disadvantage; 
(iii)  the  SDR  basket  involves  a  risk  of  the  unit  of 
account  diverging  significantly  from  all  EEC 
currencies, which would be unwelcome. 
(c)  Community  budget:  here,  as  elsewhere,  there  is 
considerable  advantage  of  convenience  to  any  EEC 
country  to  maintain  a  fixed  relationship  between  its 
own currency and the accounting unit,  because of the 
automatic matching of provisions in  its  own currency 
in  its  domestic  budget  and  payments  and  receipts 
denominated  in  units  of  account.  This  advantage 
might however  mean  - as  is  the  case  today - that 
this  fixed  relationship  between  currencies  becomes 
completely  unrealistic  from  the  point  of  view  of 
market  relations.  It  seems  nevertheless  appropriate 
that  the  definition  of  the  unit  of  account  should  in 
general  facilitate  a  realistic  relationship  between 
currencies.  Apart  from  this  consideration  the 
Committee  could  find  no  operational  reason  for 
preferring  or  rejecting  any  particular  choice  of  unit, 
although it was generally felt  that the SDR, inevitably 
introducing  non-Community  currencies  into  an 
essentially  domestic  Community  operation,  would  be 
inappropriate.  Two  things  are  in  any  case  evident: 
first,  the  problem  of conversion - whether and with 
what degree  of  up-to-date  accuracy  and frequency  of 
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much  more  importance  in  practical  effect  than  the 
choice  of  unit  of  account;  secondly,  the  extent  to 
which  transactions  through  the  budget  are  at  values 
determined  in  units  of  account  is  expected  to 
diminish,  as  the  present  member-share  contributions 
give  way  to  reliance  on  'own  resources'  determined 
in  domestic  currencies,  without  a  corresponding 
change in  the pattern of valuation of expenditures. 
15.  Briefly  summanzmg  the  main  implications  of this 
examination  of  particular  activities,  therefore,  we  have 
the following pointers to choices of units of account: 
(a)  the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  is  a 
special  <::ase,  in  which  there  are  particularly  strong 
technical  reasons  for  choosing  the  parity  grid  unit, 
and rejecting alternatives; 
(b)  there  are  no  similarly  strong  technical  arguments  111 
relation to other activities; 
(c)  the  parity  grid  unit  is  judged  the  least  appropriate 
for the European Development Fund; 
(d)  the  SDR  is  judged  least  appropriate  for  the 
Community budget and for the CAP. 
16.  The  Committee  has  not  discussed  in  detail  the 
technical  arrangements  which  may  be  necessary  in  the 
transition  from  the  present  system  to  a  new  unit  of 
account  in  every  sector.  It will  be  particularly  necessary 
to watch, in such future work, that technical arrangements 
are devised for the transition to a new unit of account, in 
such  a  way  as  not to  give  rise  to  serious  economic  and 
political  problems  for  some  member  countries,  for 
example in the agricultural sector. 
General considerations 
17;  There are several  considerations  which  apply,  with 
varying importance, to all or most of the uses  of units of 
account  apart  from  the  special  case  of  the  European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund. 
18.  The first  is  the  relative  trend  of value  of different 
units of account. 
The  Commission  simulation  exercise  (text  available  if 
required)  reveals several  points of interest in  the  relative 
values of the different units: 
(a)  although  the  values  diverge  and  converge  at  various 
points  in  time,  the  overall  divergence  is  perhaps  less 
than  the  background  of  very  wide  fluctuations  in 
relative  values  of  individual  currencies  would  have 
suggested.  This  is  because  all  the  units  represent  in 
some  sense  average  or  middle  positions,  rather  than 
extremes; 
(b)  there is  nevertheless some systematic divergence,  with 
the  SDR  weakening  and  the  parity  grid  unit 
strengthening  throughout,  with  the  EEC  basket 
generally falling between these two; 
(c)  the  recent weakness of the SDR is  a  direct  reflection 
of  its  large  US  dollar  component.  The experience  of 
March  1973  to  December  1974  cannot,  of course,  be 
assumed  for  the future.  A  future  relative  appreciation 
of the value of the US  dollar would reverse the recent 
pattern; 
(d)  the  relative  strength  which  has  in  practice  generally 
been  experienced  by  the  parity  grid,  at  least  in 
comparison with baskets of all EEC currencies. 
19.  A second aspect of the  question of relative value  is 
the  relationship  between  each  possible  unit  and  each 
individual EEC  currency.  The main point at issue  here  is 
the  convenience  to  any  one  EEC  country  of a  relatively 
stable  relationship  between  its  currency  and  the  unit  of 
account.  Where  relationships  between  currencies  are 
fluctuating,  it  is  plainly  impossible  for  all  to  enjoy  a 
stable  relationship  with  a  common  unit.  In  this  respect, 
the  parity  grid  unit  confers  great  convenience  on 
countries  with  fixed  exchange  rate  relationships. 
Inevitably,  however,  this  places  the  whole  burden  of 
adjustments  which  may  be  necessary  on other  currencies 
in  the  system,  and  the  currencies  which  diverge  most 
from  the  'snake'  group  may  have  to  undertake 
substantial  adjustments.  By  comparison  a  basket  which 
averages EEC  currency values  will  call  for adjustments in 
respect  of  all  constituent  currencies  (inevitably  a 
movement by any one currency will affect the value of the 
unit and  hence  its  relationship  with  all  other currencies), 
but  the  extremes  of  adjustment  will  tend  to  be 
moderated:  the  burden  will  be  in  some  sense  shared 
more widely and be less marked at the extremes. 
20.  The  third  general  consideration  is  that  of 
conversion arrangements. As  already indicated, conversion 
problems do not arise on the parity grid unit in respect of 
snake currencies, except at any point of deliberate central 
rate  change  (it  is  assumed  that  the  relatively  minor 
fluctuations  within  margins  in  the  EEC  currency 
arrangements are  so  small  that they  could  reasonably  he 
ignored).  In  all  other  cases,  problems  arise  over  the 
extent  to  which  arrangements  should  reflect  day-to-day 
market rate changes.  As  indicated  above,  the  'averaging' 
effect  of  EEC  baskets  may  moderate  the  extent  of 
changes  needed  at  the  maximum  for  any  one  currency, 
but there  is  otherwise  no  particular  technical  advantage 
or disadvantage from  this  point of view  in  the  choice of 
the  unit  of  account.  The extent  of  recourse  to  accurate 
market  conversion  will  be  a  matter  for  decision  in 
relation  to  the  needs  and  conditions  of  each  particular 
activity (e.g.  the special considerations relating to the CAP, 
possibly  the  desirability  of  operating  within  an  annual 
framework,  or some  other  defined  period,  in  relation  to 
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21.  A  fourth  general  consideration  is  the  frequency  of 
adjustment of units  of account.  In  the case  of the  parity 
grid  unit,  there  may  be  no  need  for  adjustment  at  any 
time  (but see  paragraph 22).  Any  adjustment of the SDR 
basket will  be  a  matter for  decision  in  the  International 
Monetary Fund, outside the Community framework. It is 
a  matter  for  consideration  - possibly  in  the  light  of 
future  developments  - whether  any  EEC  basket  would 
need adjustment from time to time or not. 
22.  A  fifth  consideration,  linked  with  the  foregoing 
comments, is  the  durability of different units  of  account. 
There  can  be  no  question  about  the  durability  of  any 
EEC  basket,  subject  to  the  possible  need  for  adjustment 
of  its  construction  which  would  be  a  matter  for 
Community  decision.  Two  reservations  must  be  noted, 
however, in relation to the other two possible units: 
(a)  Parity  grid  unit:  As  was  indicated  at the outset,  this 
unit depends upon the existence of a  set of currencies 
within  the  Community  maintaining  fixed  exchange 
rate  relationships  with  each  other.  The  group  is 
unfortunately less  representative than all  would desire. 
Any  further  diminution  in  its  size  would.  not  only 
diminish  the  importance  of  any  arguments  in  favour 
of its continued use, but might reach a  point at which 
the definition itself came under suspicion. 
(b)  SDR: When instituting the new definition of the SDR, 
the International Monetary Fund decided  to  review  it 
in  mid-1976.  It can  reasonably  be  assumed  that  an 
international  decision  on this  matter will  be  designed 
to maintain the usability of the new SDR, but the fact 
that the decision  will  necessarily  be  taken outside the 
Community framework may give grounds for caution. 
23.  The  final  general  consideration  is  political,  rather 
than  technical.  Alongside  their  function  on  the  technical 
level  as  common  denominators  for  accounting  and  in 
some  cases  for  valuation  purposes,  European  units  of 
account  have  some  presentational  importance  as  an 
indicator  of  the  Community  nature  of  activities.  An 
extension  of  the  same  thought  suggests  that  the  chosen 
units should represent the Community as  far  as  technical 
considerations  permit.  The  parity  grid  unit  is  certainly 
the  concept of definition  which  corresponds  most  to  the 
long-term  objective  of stable  exchange  rate  relationships 
between  all  EEC  countries.  In  present  conditions, 
however,  technical  considerations  tend  to  point:  first,  in 
the  direction  of  an  EEC  basket;  secondly,  in  favour  of 
the choice of a single EEC basket, rather than any variety 
of  baskets  with  different  weightings.  The  last  point  has 
particular  force  in  the  absence  of  any  very  great 
divergence  in  the  performance  of  different  EEC  baskets 
(the  two  tested  in  the  Commission  simulation  exercise 
were,  within  the  range  of  any  versions  with  reasonable 
justification, quite widely different from  each other),  and 
in  the  absence  of  specific  operational  reasons  for 
choosing particular weightings  in  relation  to  any  specific 
operation.  It is  also  worth noting that, if  an  EEC  basket 
were  adopted,  and  fixed  relationships  between  all  EEC 
currencies  were  subsequently  re-established,  the  EEC 
basket  unit would  at that stage itself  attain  a  relatively 
stable  relationship  with  all  EEC  <;:urrencies;  it  would 
then  be  a  matter  for  decision  whether  to  continue  to 
define the unit as  a  basket, or to  take the opportunity of 
redefining it on a parity grid basis. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
24.  This  is  essentially  a  technical  report,  and  the 
Committee  recognizes  that . - particularly  where  the 
technical considerations do not point strongly to any  one 
solution  formal  recommendations  would  be 
inappropriate. 
25.  Nevertheless,  it  may  assist  the  Council  in  reaching 
decisions  to  consider  the  following  framework  and 
sequence. 
26.  It  is  important to  recognize  that in  certain  sectors 
some  of the  most serious  problems in  operating units  of 
account at the present time arise over rates of conversion 
into  national  currencies  which  do  not  automatically 
follow,  and  have  in  practice  diverged  substantially  from 
market rates.  The definition  of any  new  unit of account 
will  not automatically  resolve  these  problems,  but in  the 
interest  of  moving  to  more  realistic  conversion  rates,  it 
would be  desirable to select a  definition  which would be 
well  adapted  to  this  process.  Even  so  special 
arrangements might be  needed in  some  cases  to  maintain 
these  conversion  rates  frozen  for  certain  periods of time. 
Such  special  arrangements,  however,  need  not  detract 
from  the  objective  of  choosing  a  new  and  more 
appropriate definition of the unit of account. 
27.  First  question:  Is  it  essential,  or  desirable,  that  a 
single definition of the unit of account should be adopted 
throughout  the  Community?  Setting  aside  presentational 
advantages, the Committee feels  obliged to point out that 
there  is  at  least  one  current  Community  activity  of 
importance  - the  present  intervention  and  settlement 
system  of the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  -
where strong technical reasons exist for the choice of the 
existing  parity  grid  unit;  whereas  the  choice  of  that 
particular  unit  would  seem  to  be  less  appropriate  in 
other cases, and perhaps not the most attractive choice on 
general grounds. 
28.  Second question:  Is  it necessary to introduce a  new 
unit  simultaneously  for  all  activities  to  which  it  can  be 
applied?  As  far as  technical  considerations are  concerned, 
there  is  certainly  no  necessity  for  simultaneous 
introduction  there  are  of  course  some  inter-
relationships  and  overlaps  in  the  accounts  of  different 
operations, but these  are not such  as  to make the use  of 
the  same  unit imperative.  Moreover, it appears that there 
is  considerably  more  urgency  in  some  cases  than  in 
others in  settling a new definition. 
29.  Third  question:  If  the  immediate  answer  to  the 
first  two  questions is  negative,  is  it  nevertheless  desirable 
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operate  widely,  even  if  not  immediately  or  indeed  ever 
applied to all  Community activities? If the answer to this 
question  is  in  the  affirmative,  it  would  seem  from  the 
technical  point  of  view  that  the  unit  which  would  be 
capable  of  being  applied  with  the  least  inconyenience 
over the widest range of activities would be a  satisfactory 
EEC basket. 
30.  Fourth  question: If it is  thought desirable to  adopt 
an EEC basket, what should its construction be? 
31.  Fifth  question:  Should  any  immediate  decisions  on 
units  of  account  for  particular  operations  be  adopted? 
The Committee offers three suggestions: 
(a)  European Monetary Cooperation Fund: No de!cision  is 
necessary,  but  the  Council  might  wish  to  consider 
whether to  confirm  that,  at  least  for  the  time  being, 
the  parity  grid  unit  should  continue  to  be  used, 
without  prejudice  to  decisions  in  relation  to  other 
activities. 
(b)  European  Development  Fund:  The  Committee 
understands that it is  essential  to settle a  new unit of 
account for  this  fund  before it commences operations 
in  1976,  and  that it  is  desirable  for  the  assurance  of 
all concerned to settle the matter as early as possible. 
(c)  European  Investment  Bank:  There  is  particular 
urgency  for  the  bank  to  adopt  an  interim  measure 
that will  enable it to  apply  realistic exchange rates  in 
the presentation of its  annual  accounts for  1974.  This 
need not prejudice subsequent decisions.  If a  decision 
on  the  European  Development  Fund  was  taken, 
however, this might assist the authorities of the EIB  in 
deciding on a satisfactory interim measure. 
(d)  In  relation  to  aU  other activities,  the  services  of the 
Commission  should  be  invited,  in  the  light  of 
convenience  of timing  and  any  special  considerations 
of urgency, to continue its studies and make proposals 
as  appropriate  in  conformity  with  the  general 
direction of the Council  decision  in  principle in  reply 
to the third question above. 
ANNEX II 
REPORT  TO  THE  COUNCIL  AND  THE  COMMISSION  ON  THE  REFORM  OF  THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
1.  In  accordance with the request made by  the Council 
at its  meeting of 16  June 1975,  the Monetary Committee 
has  reviewed  the  outcome  of  the  Paris  meeting  of  the 
ll\1F  Interim Committee on 10  and l1 June 1975  and the 
prospects for future progress. 
2.  The  Committee considers  that agreement should  be 
sought over the whole range of problems discussed at the 
Paris  meeting  of the Interim  Committee  and  recorded  in 
the press communique, as  a  package including the review 
of quotas. The following sections of this  report consider 
the  elements  of  a  possible  agreement,  in  a  constructive 
spirit,  and  identify  the  outstanding  points  of  contention 
and possible Community positions on them. 
IMF gold 
3.  The  Committee  recommends  endorsement  of  the 
proposals, which received wide acceptance in  Paris, under 
which  the  stock of approximately  150  million  ounces  of 
gold  held  by  the  fund  should  be  dealt  with  broadly  as 
follows: 
two-thirds  (100  million  ounces)  to  be  left  with  the 
fund, its future disposal would be decided by an 85 % 
majority of the executive board/governors; the articles 
of the fund should include enabling powers to permit 
a  wide  range  of  decisions,  within  the  framework  of 
the  general  purposes  of  the  IMF  anJ  not  excluding 
either further restitution or further sales; 
one-sixth (25  million ounces) to be refunded to existing 
members  in  proportion  to  quotas  on  (1  July  1975); 
recipients would be required to reimburse the IMF, in 
their  own  currencies,  which  they  would  not  be 
obliged  to  repurchase, to an  amount corresponding to 
the  official  SDR  value  of  the  refunded  gold (1);  no 
other conditions would he attached by the fund; 
one-sixth  (25  million  ounces)  to  be  sold  by  the fund, 
in  a  manner that could  maximize  the  yield,  either  in 
the  market,  or  to  members  at  prices  that  take  into 
account  the  current  situation  in  gold  markets;  the 
equivalent  of  the  official  SDR  value  of  gold  sold 
would  he  retained  in  the  IMP  general  account,  and 
any surplus would be used in  accordance with  future 
decisions on expenditure in the interests of developing 
countries, particularly those with low income. 
Although  the  proportions  specified  above  are  acceptable 
to  all  members  of  the  Committee,  there  could  be  some 
room  for  negotiation;  hut  the  relative  percentage  under 
the last two categories should remain equal. 
(1)  The  problem  of  maint-:nancc  of  value  in  respect  of  currencies 
paid  to  the  fund  in  exchange  for  gold  was  recognized  by  the 
Committee.  It  was  felt  however,  that  this  problem  would  most 
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Gold transactions by monetary authorities 
4.  All  Community countries are prepared to  enter inro 
arrangements  on  gold  transactions  by  monetary 
authorities outside the articles of the fund  provided  such 
arrangements  are  faithful  to  the  Zeist  consensus  and  do 
not include  any  limitation  on  transactions  by  individual 
countries  in  addition  to  those  indicated  in  Annex  I, 
which sets out the text proposed by the Committee. 
S.  As  agreed  by  the  Interim  Committee,  the 
arrangements  would  be  outside  the  articles  but  there 
would  he  scope  for  reference  in  IMF  articles  in  two 
forms: 
l(a)  maintenance  in  Article  VIII  of obligations to  report 
gold holdings  by  monetary  authorities;] 
(h)  a  clause  on  policy  on  gold  generally,  linked  with 
and explained further in  the following section. 
Reserve currencies 
<1.  During  earlier  discussions  of  international  monetary 
reform,  the  Community  adopted  an  agreed  position  in 
favour  of  arrangements  for  settlement  and  convertibility 
which  would  have  involved  the  phasing  out  of  reserve 
currencies.  While  accepting  the  impossibility  in  the 
immediate future  of implementing such  arrangements,  all 
members  of  the  Committee  would  see  advantage  in 
incorporating  in  IMF  articles  some  indication  of  this 
direction  of  future  evolution  of  the  international 
monetary system. The point could perhaps be covered by 
a clause on the following lines: 
'Each  member  undertakes  to  collaborate  with  the 
fund  and  with  other  members  to  promote  the 
establishment  of  the  special  drawing  right  as  the 
principal reserve asset and the reduction of the role of 
gold  and  of  reserve  currencies  in  the  international 
monetary system.' 
Exchange rate arrangements 
7.  The  disputed  points  in  the  Paris  meeting  were:  the 
definition  of  the  ultimate  objective,  and  the  sequence  of 
arrangements  or  rules  for  declaration  of  a  future  par 
value  system  and  initial  adherence  and  subsequent 
obedience to it. 
X.  On  the  ultimate  objective,  the  Committee  would 
wish  to  see  included  in  the  articles  the  language  agreed 
in  the  Paris  communique,  which  was  in  turn  based  on 
language in the  'Outline of reform'  agreed  in  Nairobi  in 
1973, namely: 
'The  ultimate  objective  is  a  system  based  on  stable 
hut  adjustable  par  values  and  the  floating  of 
currencies  in  particular  situations,  subject  to 
appropriate rules and surveillance of the fund.' 
9.  Annex  II  contains  a  series  of  drafts  on  the  main 
issues  of the  establishment of a  future  par  value  system 
and adherence to it.  There is  no dispute over the formula 
for  establishing  the  new  system,  on  a  decision  which 
would  require only  a  [simple]  majority.  It is  on  the  two 
rem:1ining points that difficulty arises: 
the  degree  of  obligation  on  an  individual  member  to 
adhere  to  the  new  system  by  declaring par values  for 
its own currency; 
the  degree  of  constraint  to  be  applied  to  a  member 
which  ha5  adopted  a  par  value  and  wishes 
subsequently to allow its currency to float. 
The  Annex  offers  three  alternatives  under  each  heading, 
ranging from  free  choice of the member to full  authority 
of the fund.  A  great majority of members could  agree  to 
alternative 2  under both headings, either as  a  first choice 
or as  an  attempt to  find  a  common position. 
Revi~ion of quotas 
l 0.  The  Committee  has  not  considered  quota  revisiOn 
possibilities  in  detail.  It  considers,  however,  that  the 
Community  should  approach  US  authorities  in  order  to 
give  them  assurances  that  an  adequate  procedure  could 
he  arranged  so  that  their  new  voting  power  resulting 
from  quota  revision  would  not  come  into  effect  before 
approval of the amended articles. 
Appendix  I 
Proposed undertaking with respect to trading in gold 
Participants  to  the  undertaking  agree  that  monetary  authorities  are  free  to  engage  111  trans-
actions in gold subject to the understanding outlined below: 
(a)  transactions  in gold will not  be  undertaken with  the  objective  of de  facto  establishing  a 
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(b)  no  purchase  of gold  will  be  made  when  the  effect  would  be  to  increase  the  combined 
volume  of  gold  holdings  of  the  member  governments  plus  the  IMF  above  the  level  of 
1 May 1975; 
(c)  these  undertakings  will  be  reviewed  within  two  years  or  at  any  time  if  it  appears  that, 
contrary  to  the  intention expressed  in  (a)  above,  transactions  in  gold  are  in  fact  leading 
to the establishment of a fixed gold price. 
Some  members  consider  that  the  effective  date  of  the  agreement  cannot  be  left  open,  and 
neither  do  they  accept that  the  agreement be  subject  to  continual  review.  They  accordingly 
propose the following alternative version of (c): 
'These undertakings will  run for  two years  following  the entry into force  of the  amended 
articles. During this period they may be subject to concertation if,  contrary to the intention 
expressed  in  (a)  above,  transactions  in  gold  are  in  fact  leading  to  the establishment  of a 
fixed gold price.' 
Appendix  II 
(a)  Establishment of system 
The  fund  shall  notifv  members,  <.b  soon  as  co11ditions 
permit,  that  par  val~es  may  he  re-established  for  the 
purposes  of  this  agreement  in  terms  of  the  special 
drawing right,  or such  other common  denominator  as  is 
prescribed  by  the fund.  The  common  denominator  shall 
not be gold or a currency. 
(b)  Adherence of a member to the system 
Alternative 1 
A member may propose a par value  at any  time  after the 
notice is given under (a)  above. 
Alternative 2 
A  member shall  propose a  par value  within  a  reasonable 
time  after  the  notice  is  given  under  (a)  above  unless  the 
member  represents  to  the  fund  that  the  member's 
circumstances  do  not  permit  the  establishment  of  a  par 
value.  The  fund  shall  not  challenge  such  representation. 
The member shall,  however, keep  in  regular  consultation 
with  the  fund  and  conduct  its  exchange  rate  policy  in 
accordance  with  such  guidelines  for  floating  as  the  fund 
may establish. 
Alternatiue 3 
A  member shall  propose  a  par value  within a  rc;lsonablc 
time  after  the  notice  given  under  (a)  above  unless  the 
member  represents  to  the  fund  and  the  fund  agrees  that 
the  member's  circumstances  do  not  just1f:  the 
establishment of a par value. 
(c)  Subsequent temporary floating 
Alternatiue 1 
The par value  of a  member's  currency  established  under 
this agreement shall cease to exist for the purposes of this 
agreement  if  the  member  informs  the  fund  that  it  has 
terminated the par value. 
Altent<ztil'c 2 
The par  value  of  a  member's  currency  established  under 
this  agreement  shall  cease  to  exist  for  the  purposes  of 
this  agreement if  the  member represents  to  the fund  that 
its  circumstances  no  longer  permit  it  to  maintain  a  par 
value.  The fund shall not challenge such  representation. A 
member  which  has  thus  terminated  its  par  value  shall 
immediately  consult  with  the  fund  and  shall  conduct its 
exchange  rate  policy  in  accordance with  such  guidelines 
for floating as  the fund may establish. 
Altenhttiue .3 
The par  value  of  a  member's  currencv  established  under 
this agreement shall cease to exist for the purposes of thi-; 
agreement if  the member informs the fund that it intends 
to  terminate  the  par  value  and  the  fund  authorizes 
termination  subject  to  such  conditions  as  it  may  deem 
appropriate. 
Certain  members  consider  that  the  Committee  could 
usefully  make  an  inventory  of  a  range  of  possible 
technical  variants  to  the  alternatives  2  and  3  above 
concerning  both adherence  to the system  and subsequent 
temporary floating.  In  all  cases,  the final  decision, which 
in  the  last  analysis  belongs  to  the  member  country,  can 
only  he  taken  after  having  previously  exhausted  the 
following  procedures which  are  listed  in  ascending order 
of moral constraint: 
I.  the  member must justify  its  request,  at;d authorization 
will  he  granted  on  the  overwhelming  benefit  of  the 
doubt; 
2.  the member must justify its request, and authorization 
will  be  accompanied by  specific  guidelines  defined  hy 
the fund on an ad hoc basis; 
3.  the  member  must  justify  its  request.  Before  granting 
its  authorization,  the  fund  may  ask  the  member  to 
reconsider  its  position  (within  a  certain  time  period); 
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4.  the  member  must  jus.tify  its  request.  Authorization 
will be granted by the fund on a  temporary basis and 
at  the  end  of  the  agreed  period,  the  member  shall 
renew  its  request; 
5.  the member must justify  its  request.  Authorization  of 
the  fund  will  be  granted  but  on  a  temporary  basis, 
and may be revoked at any time; 
6.  the  member must  justify  its  request.  Authorization of 
the  fund  will  be  granted  on  a  majority  of  [85]  [80] 
[70]  [500/o]. 
Other  members  have  suggested  an  intermediate'  positiOn 
between alternatives 1  and 2  under (b)  above, as  follows: 
A member may propose a  par value at any time after the 
notice  is  given  under  (a)  above. If it does  not feel  to  be 
in  a  position  to  do  so,  it  shall  keep  in  regular 
consultation with the fund and shall conduct its exchange 
rate  policy  in  accordance  with  such  guidelines  for 
floating as the fund may establish. 
ANNEX 1li 
METHODS  OF  PROTECTING THE HOLDER  OF  BONDS  AGAINST  INFLATION  AND 
THEIR  EFFECTS  ON  INTRA-COMMUNITY  CAPITAL  MOVEMENTS  IF  THEY  WERE 
ADOPTED 
The  high  rate  of  inflation  prevalent  in  most  Member 
States  has  led  the  members  of  the  Working  Party  on 
Securities  Markets to  look into the question of protecting 
rhe holder of fixed-interest securities against losses caused 
hy the fall  in the value of money. 
The experts concentrated  on  two  aspects in particular: 
the methods which might be used in this connection, 
the  effects  on  intra-Community  capital  movements  if 
they  were  adopted  by  some  member  countries,  and 
the  related  problem  of  the  adoption  of  concerted. 
policies on the subject by member countries. 
I.  General 
1.  The real  yield  on  bonds  falls  when  the  currency  in 
which  they  are  denominated  depreciates,  dropping  to 
zero  or  even  becoming  negative  when  the  rate  of 
inflation  matches  or  exceeds  the  coupon  rate  of  the 
securities.  Further,  the  capital  loss  may  be  compounded 
by  a  fall  in  the  stock market price  of securities  brought 
about by the rise in interest rates which usually occurs in 
times of high inflation. 
This drop in  the real  value of invested savings  is  mainly 
to  the  advantage  of  the  borrowers.  To  begin  with,  it 
would  therefore  be  necessary,  if  only  for  considerations 
of  equity,  to  adopt  measures  to  restrict  and  even 
eliminate this transfer of wealth. 
But this observation must be qualified. 
Firstly,  because  these  transfers  of  wealth  from  lender  to 
borrower  frequently  cancel  each other out,  in  the  whole 
or in  p:.ut,  when  only  a  single estate is  involved.  This is, 
for  instance,  true  of  banks,  which  have  liabilities  which 
depreciate  at  the  same  time  as  their  claims,  or  of 
individual  bond  holders  who  acquired  real  assets  with 
borrowed  funds.  The  latter  situation  occurs  very 
frequently as ownership of real property becomes easier. 
Secondly,  if  one  wished  to  compensate  the  holders  of 
bonds  retroactively,  the  date  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  would  need  to  reflect  the  date  and  terms 
when  the  bonds  were  acquired.  It would  be  inequitable 
to  compensate  all  bondholders  as  if  they  had  held  the 
bonds  from  the  date  of  issue,  because  the  bonds  might 
have been purchased on more favourable terms later than 
that date. 
Compared with the situation before the First World War, 
there  are  perhaps  not  many  estates  at  the  present  time 
which  are  made  up  exclusively  of bonds,  and  still  more 
rare  are  persons  who  depend  only  on  fixed-interest 
securities  for  their  income.  Nevertheless,  such  situations 
do arise  in  the case of private individuals  such  as  retired 
farmers  who  have  invested  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of 
their  land  in  stocks,  or  institutions,  particularly  pension 
funds.  The  latter  are  obliged  to  finance  expenditure 
which  increases at about the same rate as  inflation while 
the  value  of  their  assets  is  steadily  shrinking,  and  this 
alone would justify the adoption of suitable provisions in 
their  favour.  Nevertheless,  these  various  reservations 
show that the problem of protecting the holder of bonds 
is  not as simple to resolve as might first appear. 
2.  Apart  from  considerations  of  simple  equity,  it 
should  he  pointed  out  that  a  continuing  high  level  of 
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bondholders  and  savers  in  general  if  the  finance  needed 
to  sustain  economic  growth  is  to  be  made  available.  In 
many  European  countries,  the  post-war years  show  that 
this  was  the  main  reason  behind  the  measures  taken  at 
the time to protect savings. 
3.  The most effective  protection  for  holders  of  claims 
would obviously  be  success  in  combating inflation  itself, 
and  the  members  of  the  Working  Party  agree  that 
keeping  the  value  of money  comparatively  stable  should 
remain  a  primary objective.  But  despite  the  stabilization 
policies  adopted  in  the  member  countries,  and  owing 
probably to the variety and complexity of factors  behind 
the  progress  of  inflation,  the  currencies  of  the 
Community  countries  are  all  depreciating,  although  to 
differing degrees. 
Consequently,  there  is  unanimous  agreement  among  the 
experts that a  study should be  made of ways  and means 
of  giving  holders  of  fixed-interest  securities  minimum 
protection  against  the  decline  in  the  real  value  of  their 
investments. 
4.  Finally, it is  for consideration whether arrangements 
to protect the interests of savers should cover the past as 
well  as  the  future,  and  this  raises  the  problem  of  the 
compensation  to  be  paid  to  bond  holders  for  the  losses 
they have suffered. 
II.  The various methods of protecting the bondholders 
The  various  methods  of  ensuring  that  the  real  value  of 
the  bondholder's  capital  and  of  his  income  from  this 
capital remains comparatively stable can be broken down 
into three groups: 
1.  techniques  for  bringing  issues  more  closely  into  line 
with market conditions; 
2.  increasing, in  one form or another, the nominal yield 
of loaned funds, so as  to ensure that the real  yield  on 
the capital remains positive; 
3.  index-linking. 
The members  of the  working  party  mainly  concentrated 
on  the  first  two  points,  but  index-linking  was  also 
discussed at length. However, the general feeling was that 
the  introduction  of  index-linking  raised  a  general 
problem  which  involved  much  more  than  the  protection 
of the holder of fixed-interest securities. 
In  addition,  the  inconclusive  results  of  past  or  current 
index-linking  schemes  have  led  the  majority  of  the 
experts  to  adopt  a  very  reserved,  not  to  say  negative 
attitude to this matter. 
1.  Techniques  for  bringing  issues  more  closely  into  Line 
with  market fluctuations 
To  begin  with,  issues  could  be  brought  closely  into  line 
with  market  conditions  if  operators  were  given  greater 
freedom  in  setting  the  conditions  and  terms  of  new 
issues.  This  would  help  to  recreate  on  national  markets 
conditions similar to those prevailing on the international 
capital  market,  where,  given  the  absence  of  any 
regulations, lenders  and borrowers can  at all  times  adapt 
to  circumstances. 
The  techniques  to  be  considered  relate  to  the  level  of 
interest rates and the maturity of loans. 
(a)  The  bondholder would  no  doubt  be  better  protected 
by  an  interest  rate  policy  designed  to  allow 
him  a  positive  return  on  his  capital.  However,  the 
level  of interest rates on national markets depends on 
the  economic  situation  in  each  country  and 
particularly the intensity of inflationary pressures,  but 
also  on the  action taken  by  the monetary authorities, 
which is  itself determined by  the general requirements 
of  economic  policy.  The  monetary  authorities  are,  in 
any  case,  far  from  enjoying  complete  freedom  of 
action  in  this  field,  their  freedom  being  restricted  by 
the  influence  of  external  factors  once  cross-frontier 
capital  movements  have  heen  freed  ro  a  satisfactory 
degree. 
These  general  considerations  explain  why  protection 
of  the  holder  of  fixed-interest  securities  or  of  the 
saver  generally  cannot  be  one  of  the  monetary 
authorities' major policy objectives. 
Consequently,  the  holder  of  fixed-interest  secunt1es 
will  always  incur a  loss  once the  cost of money  rises 
above  the  interest  rates  on  his  securities.  Of  course, 
this  risk  exists  even  in  times  of comparative stability, 
hut is considerably greater in times of inflation. 
Some  of the  risk  can be  removed if the interest paid 
on hands is  periodically brought into line with market 
conditions.  Variable-rate  issues,  which  appeared  first 
on  the  international  capital  market  and  then  on 
certain national financial markets, perform this task. 
Examples  of  such  transactions  carried  out  in  the 
Member  States  include  a  loan  which  ENEL  in  Italy 
floated in June 1974;  this loan carried an interest rate 
which, without being allowed to drop below 4 °/o  per 
half-year, varies in line with the average stock market 
yield of a sample of bonds. Similarly, in December 1974 
in  France  the Groupement de  l'industrie Siderurgique 
floated  a  loan  carrying  an  interest  rate  that  is  to  be 
established in the light of average rates on the money 
market  during  the  six  months  prior  to  the  coupon's 
date of maturity. 
It  should,  however,  be  noted  that  this  technique 
normally  protects  the  holder  against  a  loss  in  the 
nominal value of capital, but not always against a loss 
in  its  real  value.  Such  is  the  case  when  the  interest 
rate stays below the rate at which the value of monev 
falls  because  inflation  rates  (and  in  particula;, 
expected rates)  are only one of the factors determining 
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(b)  Another  technique  which  facilitates  adjustment  to 
changing  market  conditions  for  the  operators  is  the 
reducing  of maturities  of loans.  Its  advantage  for  the 
holder is  that he,  during periods of sharply  increasing 
interest  rates,  can  switch  more  rapidly  to  better 
yielding investments. Also  the loss in value will not be 
so  large with short-term bonds as  it is  with long-term 
securities.  A  trend  towards  bonds  with  shorter 
maturities  has  in  fact  been  observed  during  the  past 
few  years  in  certain  Member  States  of  the 
Community. 
Thus,  the  average  maturity  of  new  loans  issued  by 
public  authorities  and  enterprises  in  Germany  has 
been  shortened  in  recent  years  from  about  15  to  20 
years  to  10  years  and  temporarily  even  five  years  in 
the autumn of 1974,  and that of mortgage bonds from 
30 to 40 years to 5 to 1  0 years. 
In  Belgium,  there  has  been  a  similar  trend  and  an 
increasing  number  of  loans  are  issued  with  an 
intermediate  maturity  which  gives  the  investor  the 
option of repayment or of holding on to  his  securities 
until  final  maturity,  with  the  interest  rate  then 
generally higher. 
Similarly,  the loan contracts could feature  anticipated 
repayment clauses  for  the  benefit of lenders,  while  at 
present  such  clauses  are  usually  for  the  benefit  of 
borrowers  only,  or  provision  could  be  made  for 
frequent  and  regular  options  of  repayment  after  a 
certain date. The GIS  loan in France mentioned  :.1bove 
carries a clause of this type from the second year. 
2.  Jncreasi11g  the vield of loaned f:mds 
(a)  The  techniques  described  above  can  only  be  applied 
to  new  issues  -and  therefore  only  protect  new 
investors.  This  leaves  the  case  of  the  holders  of  old 
bonds  whose  capital  is  shrinking  as  a  result  of 
inflation  and  of  rising  interest  rates.  Generally,  no 
overall  solution  has  ever  been  evolved  for  this 
problem  since  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  find  the 
resources  that  would  be  required  to  compensate  the 
holders.  This  is  particularly  true  with  regard  to 
securities  issued  by  the  central  government  or  public 
bodies,  which are heavily  indebted  in  some  countries. 
The  amounts  which  would  need  to  be  paid  to 
bondholders would call  for a  very substantial increase 
in  tax  revenue,  which  in  most  countries  would 
probably be difficult to obtain. 
Additionally  a  basic  problem  should  be  pointed  out. 
As  far  as  public saver protection is  concerned it could 
be  considered  desirable  to  amend  loan  conditions  in 
favour  of  the  saver  during  the  term  of  the  loan, 
consequently  deviating  from  the  actual  prospectus 
conditions.  Such  measures,  one  imagines,  could  also 
he  taken as  a result of governmental influence.  On the 
other  hand,  measures  of  this  kind  would  hardly 
represent real help for the saver,  for they might create 
precedents which  put the  character of a  fixed-interest 
security  (fixed  interest,  fixed  maturity)  into  question. 
They  could  also  contribute  to  an  unfair 
overburdening of the issuer which  he,  in  the  form  of 
prices  or  higher  taxes,  would  have  to  pass  on. 
Furthermore,  in  a  large  market  there  exists  the 
possibility  that, unjustly, investors who sold bonds on 
the  secondary market before the measures took effect 
would  not  benefit  from  the  improvement  in 
conditions.  Insecurity  on  the  market  and  a 
corresponding  loss  of  confidence  would  follow 
although the opposite result was sought after. 
This  does  not  exclude  the  possibility,  in  the  case  of 
the  existence  of  flexible  loan  conditions,  of  such 
conditions  being  implemented  by  the  issuer  in  order 
to  accelerate  the  amortization  of low  interest  bonds, 
thus  avoiding  the  necessity  of savers  being  bound  to 
interest  rates  for  too  long  a  period  of time  - these 
interest  rates,  considering  the  tendency  towards 
increased inflation, appearing to be too low. 
In  Germany,  this  solution  has  been  recently  adopted. 
There  the  mortgage  banks  and  other  issuing  banks 
have  committed  themselves,  via  their  associations,  to 
the  Government  to  using  an  annual  amount  of 
DM 200 million for the voluntary redemption of their 
low  interest  (5  and  5·5 Ofo)  debt.  These  voluntary 
redemptions  are,  in  most  cases,  carried  out  by 
repurchase outside the Stock Exchange at the  average 
issue  price.  These  repurchases  are  limited  in  amount 
per individual bondholder who has also  to prove that 
the  securities  have  been  his  property  since  a  certain 
date.  This  is  designed  to  exclude,  wherever  possible, 
the  benefit  of  these  measures  to  securities  previously 
acquired  at  the  Stock  Exchange  at  prices  below  the 
issue  price. A further form of voluntary redemption is 
the  anticipated  drawing  or  redemption  of  single 
tranches or whole issues. 
In  various  countries  there  are  also  isolated  cases  of 
private  or  public  sector  borrowers  who  have  agreed 
to  repurchase  their securities  below  the  stock  market 
price  - usually  when  new  issues  are  launched,  such 
as  the  recent  IMI  issue  in  Italy  - or  to  raise  the 
interest paid on bonds in  circulation, as  has happened 
recently in Austria. 
(h)  Consideration  could  also  be  given  to  tax 
arrangements  under which  tax is  levied  only  on  that 
parr of the  interest which  exceeds the rate of the fall 
in  the  value  of  money,  i.e.  the  real  income.  Some 
years  ago  in  Germany  a  taxpayer  tried  to  obtain  a 
ruling  along  these  lines  from  the  Federal  Finance 
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Similar proposals have been made in  several  countries 
by  various  economic  and  political  groups.  Under  all 
of  them,  tax  would  be  levied  only  on  part  of  the 
nominal interest yield:  either on the basic interest rate 
- interest received in excess being exempt - or only 
on  that  part  of  the  interest  that  corresponds  to  the 
proportion  of  the  rate  in  excess  of  the  rate  of 
inflation.  None  of  these  proposals  has  as  yet  been 
implemented,  at  least  in  the  various  Community 
countries. 
(c)  In  practice,  the  interest  paid  to  bondholders  is 
increased  only  indirectly  and  in  a  general  way 
through  measures  to  encourage  savings  generally. 
Examples include the French tax exemptions for bond 
interest up to FF 3 000, the tax exemptions granted in 
some  countries  for  funds  invested  in  the  form  of 
secunttes  under  savings  schemes,  and  premiums 
granted hy the State. 
1.  Index-linking 
Index-linking  is  a  highly  controversial  technique.  It 
consists of establishing a  link between the nominal value 
of  capital  or  interest,  or  both,  :md  an  index  of 
purchasing power. 
The  cost-of-living  index  is  usually  taken  as  a  reference 
hut this  is  not an absolute  rule  and it is  equally  possible 
to  use  the wholesale price index  (Brazil),  the index of a 
foreign  currency's  rate  of exchange  (the  US  $  in  Israel) 
or  an  index  reflecting  the  activity  of  the  borrower 
(turnover for example). 
A  large  majority  of  the  members  of  the  working  party 
agreed that it was hardly possible to isolate  the  problem 
of  indexing  fixed-interest  securities  from  the  more 
general  problem of indexing claims  in  the  economy  as  a 
whole (1). 
In  the  present  economic  setting,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
introduce  index-linking  on  to  the  financial  market 
without extending it to  other forms  of saving.  However, 
general  index-linking  of  savings  would  in  the  end  be 
likely  to sustain, if not exacerbate, inflationary pressures. 
Merely  because  of  transfers  between  accounts,  the 
financial  institutions and  the banks  would  be obliged  to 
index  virtually  all  their  commitments  whilst  being 
practically unable to reassess their old claims. 
It  would no doubt be possible to  restrict index-linking to 
financial  assets  tied  up  for  a  given  period  of  time,  such 
as  fixed-term  deposits and deposits at notice,  or blocked 
savings  accounts. However, were such  a  distinction  to  be 
made,  the  financial  institutions  and  the  banks, 
particularly  those  in  countries  where  credit  institutions 
(1)  The  subject  is  discussed  further  in  the  study  by  the  OECD 
Financial  Markets  Committee  entitled  'Index-linking  of  fixed 
interest  securities'  (OECD,  Paris  1973). 
are  highly  specializ'ed,  would  find  themselves  in  very 
different  competitive  situations,  depending  on  the 
proportion  of  indexed  items  in  their  resources.  Finally, 
choosing a  reference  index  for  financial  assets  is,  in  itself, 
quite a delicate matter. 
Apart from  these  general  considerations,  another  decisive 
reason  that  in  the  view  of  a  majority  of  the  experts 
militates  against  adopting  index-linking  as  a  measure  to 
protect  the  holder  of  fixed-interest  securities  is  that  the 
experience  gained  in  the  past  has  not  been  very 
convincing.  The  Finnish  authorities  had  had  to 
acknowledge  failure  in  this  field.  The  Brazilian  model, 
which is  frequently  cited  as  an example, operates against 
an  economic  and  political  background  that  would  be 
difficult to imagine in  Europe. 
In  the  Community,  France  is  the  only  country  where 
there were any significant issues of index-linked bonds by 
the  public  and  the  private  sector  (during  the  1950s). 
However,  careful  studies  have  shown,  at  least  where 
securities issued  by  the private sector are concerned, that 
holders  of index-linked  securities  had generally  not been 
any  better  protected  than  if  they  had  bought  ordinary 
bonds. 
Index-linking to general purchasing power indices  and to 
indices  of  certain  products  or  raw  materials, 
representative  of price levels  (for  example gold),  has  not 
been  permitted  in  France  since  the  1958  stabilization 
plan, but index-linking to the price of goods and services 
produced  by  the  borrower  is  still  permitted.  In  other 
countries,  notably  Germany,  any  linking  with  the 
monetary  value  of  goods  and  services,  or  with  indices 
representative  of  the  general  price  trend,  is  subject  to 
authorization,  which,  however,  is  never  granted  in  the 
financial field. 
In  the United Kingdom, there has not been  a  full  indexed 
savings  scheme  of  any  kind  so  far.  However,  the 
Covernment  are  introducing  in  June  and  July  1975  two 
modest,  experimental  indexed  savings  schemes  strictly 
limited  to  small  savers  and  in  restricted  amounts.  Under 
these schemes only capital will be indexed. A small bonus 
will  be paid at maturity which will  give  the saver a  low 
but positive  real  rate  of  return.  There  are  no  proposals 
for extending indexation beyond these schemes. 
III.  Effects  on intra-community capital movements of the 
adoption  by  one  or  more  States  of  measures  to  protect 
bondholders 
Let  us  assume  that  one  or  more  Community  countries 
take  measures  to  protect  holders  of  fixed-interest 
securities.  Would  such  decisions  disrupt  capital 
movements  to  the  detriment  of  the  other  member 
countries? There is no clear-cut answer to this question. 
1.  In  the present circumstances it should first be borne 
in  mind that private individuals investing in  fixed-interest No C 132/18  Official Journal of the European Communities  14.6. 76 
secuntles  on  national  markets  usually  know  little  about 
foreign  capital  markets  and  consequently  are  hardly 
likely to place their money there. There would have to be 
a  considerable  difference  in  the  conditions  between 
markets  for  it  to  be  otherwise.  Where  there  are  tax 
advantages,  these  are  not  usually  any  better  known 
outside  the  frontiers  and  are  frequently  available  to 
nationals only.  This ignorance of markets other than the 
national  market  is  further  aggravated  in  some  countries 
by  the  existence  of  rules  prohibiting  advertising  for 
foreign issues. 
Institutional  investors  are  in  a  much  better  position  to 
assess  the  advantages  of investing  on  one  market  rather 
than  another,  but many  of them  are  subject  to  rules  on 
the  investment  of  their  assets  which  in  practice 
considerably reduce their freedom of action. 
2.  Furthermore,  until  a  high  degree  of  economic, 
monetary  and  financial  integration  has  been  achieved 
within  the  Community,  and  particularly  as  long  as 
currencies continue to  float,  investors  acquiring securities 
issued  in  other  Community  countries  will  be  faced  with 
an exchange risk that is difficult to evaluate. 
From this point of view,  measures taken by  a  country to 
protect  bondholders  or  savers  in  general  could  lose  a 
great  deal  of their appeal  in  that they  would  reflect  the 
weakness of that country's currency. 
3.  These  general  arguments  are  less  cogent  in  the 
specific  case  of  economies  which,  like  those  in  the 
Community,  have  particularly  close  economic,  monetary 
or financial  links  with  each other.  Clearly,  therefore,  any 
measure  taken  in  isolation  by  one  of  the  member 
countries  to  protect  or  help  bondholders  or  savers  in 
general  could  affect  the  direction  or  size  of  capital 
movements. 
4.  This  will  be  exactly  the  pattern  which  will  emerge 
throughout  the  Community  as  the  conditions  in  which 
capital  markets  operate  are  aligned  within  the  wider 
framework  of  the  programme  to  achieve  economic  and 
monetary union. 
IV.  Conclusions 
All  this  highlights  the  need  for  Member  States  to 
coordinate,  within  the  Community  institutions,  any 
significant initiatives they may take to  help  the holder of 
fixed-interest  securities.  The arrangements to  be  made or 
developed  further  should  be  based  on  the  techniques 
described  in  II  (1)  and  (2)  above,  although  even  these 
measures can pose substantial difficulties. 